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FOREWORD

THE FUTURE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & AARON L. NIELSON†
World-class appellate lawyers, as a rule, do not downplay
favorable precedent. Yet during oral argument in BNSF Railway Co.
v. Loos,1 prominent appellate advocate Lisa Blatt concluded her
argument to the U.S. Supreme Court with this remarkable statement:
“I hate to cite it, but I will end with Chevron.”2 “Chevron,” of course,
refers to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,3 perhaps the most cited case in all of administrative law.4 The
Chevron doctrine is a familiar one: where an administering agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute is reasonable, courts should
defer to it.5 In BNSF Railway, that doctrine would have helped Ms.

Copyright © 2021 Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson.
† Kristin E. Hickman is the McKnight Presidential Professor in Law, Distinguished
McKnight University Professor, and Harlan Albert Rogers Professor in Law at the University of
Minnesota. Aaron L. Nielson is Professor of Law at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University. In addition to the authors whose contributions are recognized in this
Foreword, we would like to acknowledge and thank Aditya Bamzai, Nicholas Bednar, Jonathan
Choi, Ronald Krotoszynski, Lidiya Mishchenko, Arti Rai, Bijal Shah, Dan Walters, and Judge
Jeffrey S. Sutton for contributing their time and ideas to the Symposium that this Foreword
introduces.
1. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893 (2019).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, BNSF Ry., 139 S. Ct. 893 (No. 17-1042); see also, e.g.,
Daniel Hemel, Argument Analysis: Hating on Chevron, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:43 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-hating-on-chevron [https://perma.cc/HG8A9QQR] (discussing counsel’s unwillingness to push for deference).
3. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1393–94 (2017) (documenting citation counts of several prominent cases);
Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 772
(2017) (evaluating most-cited cases).
5. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
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Blatt’s client.6 Rather than trumpet Chevron, however, Ms. Blatt
“treat[ed it] as no more than a last resort.”7
Why did Ms. Blatt “hate to cite” Chevron? Perhaps because the
Supreme Court has not been very receptive to Chevron deference
claims in recent years. In fact, the Court has been reluctant to apply the
doctrine.8 Noting this trend, Justice Samuel Alito has observed that
Chevron is “now [an] increasingly maligned precedent” that the Court
feels comfortable “simply ignoring.”9 Two Justices have suggested that
Chevron is unconstitutional,10 two more have criticized it as
conceptually muddled,11 and two more still have urged that it be
significantly narrowed.12 Both the upsurge of “anti-administrativist”
rhetoric in recent years13 and the elevation of Justice Amy Coney
Barrett—whose exact views are unknown, but who many predict will
be less pro-Chevron than the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg14—have
left some wondering whether Chevron is long for this world.15 Indeed,

6. See BNSF Ry., 139 S. Ct. at 908 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“And the Chevron doctrine, if
it retains any force, would seem to allow BNSF to parlay any statutory ambiguity into a colorable
argument for judicial deference to the IRS’s view, regardless of the Court’s best independent
understanding of the law.”); see also Brief for Petitioner at 36, BNSF Ry., 139 S. Ct. 893 (No. 171042), 2018 WL 3572364, at *36 (claiming Chevron deference for the agency’s interpretation).
7. BNSF Ry., 139 S. Ct. at 908 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020) (failing to mention Chevron, despite
disagreement in the briefs over Chevron’s applicability); PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris
Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2055 (2019) (declining to resolve whether a Federal
Communications Commission final order was eligible for Chevron deference); Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (rejecting deference where “the Executive seems of two
minds” because the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Labor Relations Board
disagreed about how to interpret the statute).
9. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
10. See Kristin Hickman & Aaron Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931,
934–35 & n.15 (2021) (describing suggestions from Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch
that Chevron violates the separation of powers).
11. See id. & nn.14, 16 (explaining that Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh have
each offered important conceptual criticisms of Chevron, albeit different ones).
12. See id. at 935 (observing that Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, has
urged a narrower version of Chevron deference).
13. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44–50 (2017).
14. See, e.g., Jeff Overley, Chevron Deference’s Future in Doubt If Barrett Is Confirmed,
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2020, 11:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1318381/chevron-deferences-future-in-doubt-if-barrett-is-confirmed [https://perma.cc/R9SG-VGCP].
15. See, e.g., id. (“Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s expected ascent to the U.S. Supreme Court
would likely propel a conservative crusade against so-called Chevron deference to the brink of a
triumph . . . .”).
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if law is nothing more than prediction,16 then perhaps Chevron has
already been overruled.
That view, however, is too simplistic. Even if they might
sometimes do so only grudgingly,17 lower court judges regularly rely on
Chevron18—and the Supreme Court rarely reverses those decisions.
Chevron continues to play a significant role in the law, even if it is
rarely cited by the Justices. Nor is it clear that the Supreme Court is
looking to toss out Chevron altogether. In its 2019 decision in Kisor v.
Wilkie,19 a divided Court rejected a chorus of calls to overrule
Chevron’s cousin, Auer v. Robbins,20 which prescribed judicial
deference when an agency interprets ambiguities in its own
regulations.21 Instead, the Court merely narrowed Auer’s scope.22 The
Court’s reluctance to overrule Auer, a much less important decision
than Chevron, suggests that the Court may not be inclined to overrule
Chevron deference outright.23
So what is Chevron’s future? That may be the most significant
question right now in all of administrative law. In Narrowing Chevron’s
Domain, also published in this issue, we predict that the Supreme
Court will curtail Chevron but not overrule it.24 We also offer the
16. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897)
(“The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force
through the instrumentality of the courts.”).
17. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302
(2018) (explaining that outside of the D.C. Circuit, federal appellate judges generally “are not
fans of Chevron”).
18. See, e.g., Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We conclude that we
must defer to the SSA’s intervening interpretation of the statute, which is a reasonable one.”);
Santana v. Barr, 975 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2020) (deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals
under the Chevron standard); Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit
Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2017) (reviewing 2,272 decisions and concluding that “agencies
won significantly more in the circuit courts when Chevron deference applied”).
19. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
20. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
21. Id. at 461 (stating that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is “controlling
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” and citing cases).
22. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414 (“We take the opportunity to restate, and somewhat expand
on, [Auer’s limiting] principles here to clear up some mixed messages we have sent.”).
23. That said, a cryptic statement from the Chief Justice—whose vote was necessary to save
even a weakened version of Auer deference in Kisor—arguably suggests some willingness to
revisit Chevron itself. See id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (“Issues surrounding
judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations are distinct from those raised
in connection with judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes . . . . I do not regard the
Court’s decision today to touch upon the latter question.”).
24. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 10, at 996–98.
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Justices what we believe is a coherent path forward. The Court should
hold that Chevron only applies in the rulemaking context and not to
agency interpretations announced through agency adjudications.25
Limiting Chevron’s scope in this way would be more faithful to the
underlying theoretical justifications for Chevron deference in the first
place.26 It also would put a stop to the unfair retroactivity that
motivates some of the sharpest criticisms of Chevron and cut off the
opportunity for some agencies to bootstrap their way into Chevron
deference through their procedural choices.27 We agree with Justice
Neil Gorsuch, for example, that allowing agencies to change the law
retroactively by means of Chevron deference for agency adjudications
should stop.28 Nor, in our view, is stare decisis quite the obstacle to such
reform that one might think. After all, the instances in which the Court
has deferred under Chevron overwhelmingly have arisen in the context
of rulemaking—including but by no means limited to Chevron itself—
and the Court’s “precedent on precedent” from cases like Kisor and
Mead29 recognizes that stare decisis has less force when it comes to
decisions curtailing deference short of overruling it.30
We do not have a monopoly on wisdom, however, much less a
crystal ball. A topic as important as judicial deference to administrative
action will always be the launching pad for new thinking and debate.
Accordingly, it is appropriate that this year’s Symposium addresses the
future of Chevron from a number of different perspectives.
Professor Thomas Merrill—who himself has played an outsized
role in Chevron’s development31—sets the stage by positing a
distinction between the “Chevron decision” and the “Chevron
doctrine.”32 As he puts it, Chevron itself was rightly decided, but it is a
mistake to turn Chevron into “a mechanical doctrine that fails to reflect

25. See id. at 964.
26. See id. at 964–80.
27. See id. at 938.
28. See id. at 963 (discussing Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)).
29. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
30. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 10, at 992.
31. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2433 n.49 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(citing Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1085–86 (1997)); Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.11 (2001) (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001)); Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163,
187 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1023 (1992)).
32. See Thomas W. Merrill, Re-Reading Chevron, 70 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1154 (2021).
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the broader traditions of administrative law.”33 Instead, Merrill
advocates reframing Chevron deference around rule-of-law,
constitutional, accountability, and process values.34 Focusing on those
values, in his view, would create a doctrine that better accords with the
judiciary’s proper role.35 According to Merrill, moreover, the actual
Chevron decision—with the exception of a pair of “provocative”
paragraphs—supports this more nuanced approach.36 Notably,
Merrill’s concern with how Chevron has evolved since 1984 accords
with recent remarks from Judge Lawrence Silberman, one of
Chevron’s earliest defenders,37 urging a more muscular Chevron Step
Two to prevent agencies from “exploit[ing] statutory ambiguities,
assert[ing] farfetched interpretations, and usurp[ing] undelegated
policymaking discretion.”38 Merrill’s tradition-focused view of the role
that deference should play in administrative law may also may have
appealed to the late Justice Antonin Scalia, at one time the Court’s
most vigorous defender of Chevron39 but also someone who, in his later
years, began to experience buyer’s remorse about what it had
become.40
Professors Elizabeth Fisher and Sidney Shapiro also seek a new
understanding of Chevron by exploring how Chevron’s critics and
supporters think about administrative law more generally. They cast

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1156–77.
Id. at 1174–77.
Id. at 1195.
See Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 821, 822 (1990) (“Chevron’s rule . . . is simply a sound recognition that a political
branch, the executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than the judiciary.”).
38. Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J., concurring).
39. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17 (defending Chevron as a background rule of law against which
Congress can legislate that “is unquestionably better than what preceded it,” given an era of
“[b]road delegation to the Executive” and “agency rulemaking powers [as] the rule rather than,
as they once were, the exception”).
40. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109–11 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (questioning whether the Court’s “elaborate law of deference to agencies’
interpretations of statutes and regulations” is compatible with the Administrative Procedure
Act); United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 494 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part) (accusing the Court of “add[ing] yet another lop-sided story to the ugly and
improbable structure that our law of administrative review has become”); Adam J. White, Scalia
and Chevron: Not Drawing Lines, But Resolving Tensions, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (Feb. 23, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/scalia-and-chevron-not-drawing-lines-butresolving-tensions-by-adam-j-white [https://perma.cc/A24Z-WJXW] (recognizing Justice Scalia’s
late-career concerns about Chevron deference).
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the debate about Chevron’s legitimacy as rooted in a disagreement
over “whether administrative law is to be the law of public
administration”—that is, pursuing administrative competence as
opposed to merely constraining agency action.41 Fisher and Shapiro
argue that Congress establishes agencies, and agencies develop
administrative competence, because effective government requires not
only “the articulation of rules” but also “expert administrative
capacity” to both “execute . . . legislative mandates” and “articulate
what those mandates mean.”42 They assert that this understanding of
administrative competence dates back to the Founding generation and
Marbury v. Madison43 and that Chevron’s opponents have lost sight of
that history.44 Considered within the frame of pursuing administrative
competence, Fisher and Shapiro contend that “Chevron requires a
judge to assess the nature of administrative competence at both steps
one and two,” appreciating “that legal questions of statutory
construction are entangled with understandings of administrative
competence” and that “understandings of administrative competence
inform the overall process of statutory interpretation.”45
For their part, Professors Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner address
an unintended consequence of Chevron.46 Whereas the Court once
justified Chevron as facilitating agency policy choice,47 Masur and
Posner explain that the doctrine is now used to stifle rather than further
sensible policymaking by manipulating Chevron deference and
statutory interpretation “to deprive agencies of the power to consider
certain benefits generated by regulations.”48 In particular, Masur and
Posner argue that the Trump administration attempted to evade
statutorily required cost-benefit analysis that could have hindered the
41. Elizabeth Fisher & Sidney Shapiro, Disagreement About Chevron: Is Administrative Law
the “Law of Public Administration”?, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 111, 112 (2021).
42. Id. at 119.
43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
44. Fisher & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 127–29.
45. Id. at 129, 132.
46. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis, 70
DUKE L.J. 1109, 1109 (2021).
47. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)
(explaining that “federal judges . . . have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by” the
expert and more politically accountable executive branch); cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400,
2413 (2019) (plurality) (arguing that judicial deference generally allows agencies to better use
their “‘unique expertise,’ often of a scientific or technical nature” to address “complex or
changing circumstances”) (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S.
144, 151 (1991)).
48. See Masur & Posner, supra note 46, at 1113–14.
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administration’s deregulatory agenda by “Chevronizing” around such
statutory requirements.49 As they observe, strategic use of statutory
interpretation to evade good-government measures—a process aided
and abetted by a broad conception of Chevron—raises difficult
questions. Masur and Posner suggest that it may be possible to find a
“middle way” that strengthens, or at least retains the current version
of, Chevron for some policies but restricts the availability of deference
for others.50 But what if a “middle way” is not possible—for example,
because it requires line drawing that courts are unable to do?
Professor Matthew Lawrence similarly addresses a field where
Chevron may have an unintended consequence: appropriations.51 As
he explains, annual appropriations “preserve congressional power”
over agency decisionmaking because agencies will be reluctant to
depart too far from congressional preferences if they know that doing
so may result in less money going forward, yet permanent
appropriations “destroy” Congress’s ability to exercise that sort of
influence over agency policymaking.52 Thus, to understand the
separation of powers, one must evaluate the time dimension of an
appropriation—and this has implications for Chevron. According to
Lawrence, when courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of
permanent appropriations statutes, they further minimize Congress’s
authority, whereas deference in the context of annual appropriations
statutes is less problematic because Congress has other means of
control.53 This dynamic complicates how we should think about
Chevron, especially the theory that Chevron recognizes and respects
an implicit grant of power from Congress to agencies. Would Congress
really wish to reduce its own authority over policymaking?

49. See id. The Biden administration may also be tempted to “Chevronize” around costbenefit analysis, albeit in service of a regulatory agenda. The Obama administration’s regulatory
agenda suffered significant defeats because of inadequate cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149–50 (D.C. Cir. 2011); cf. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699,
2706 (2015) (faulting an agency for failing to consider the costs as well as the benefits of its
interpretive choice).
50. See Masur & Posner, supra note 46, at 1150.
51. See Matthew B. Lawrence, Congress’s Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron, 70
DUKE L.J. 1057, 1057 (2021).
52. Id. at 1060.
53. Id. at 1057.
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Another increasingly important part of the debate over Chevron
is the effect that deference has on individual liberty.54 Many think of
Chevron deference as a doctrine concerned with big business.55 The
“Chevron” giving rise to the Chevron doctrine, after all, is a global
energy company, and many important Chevron cases have dealt with
corporations.56 Thus, for many, the debate over Chevron is part of a
larger ideological disagreement over the role of private industry in
American society.57 Yet Chevron applies in a wide array of contexts
with more individualized and deeply personal consequences, including
immigration.58 Professors Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Christopher
Walker tackle this distinct question by presenting “the case against
Chevron deference in immigration adjudication.”59 As they put it, “the
theoretical foundations for Chevron deference crumble” in the context
of immigration adjudication.60 Rather than focusing on judicial reform
alone, moreover, they urge the political branches to narrow Chevron’s
domain, for example, by choosing rulemaking rather than adjudication
as “the predominant administrative tool for implementing Congress’s
immigration laws and for making immigration policy at the agency
level,” and also “by not seeking Chevron deference in immigration
adjudication.”61 As Wadhia and Walker acknowledge, the feasibility of
the latter is hotly debated but seems to be supported by Justices
Gorsuch and Stephen Breyer.62
All of this leads to a question: Assuming it makes sense to reform
Chevron, what role should stare decisis play? In Narrowing Chevron’s

54. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 495 (2019)
(explaining that courts do and should apply Chevron differently when “intrusion[s] on physical
liberty” are concerned).
55. See, e.g., Overley, supra note 14 (suggesting that overruling Chevron would “strengthen
corporate America’s hand in litigation with federal regulators”).
56. See, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 304 (2014); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 129 (2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512
U.S. 218, 220 (1994); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
57. See, e.g., Joshua S. Sellers, “Major Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930,
933 (2019) (linking debates about the proper scope of Chevron’s domain “to the broader debate
over the legitimacy of the regulatory state itself”).
58. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999).
59. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron
Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1234 (2021).
60. Id. at 1201.
61. Id. at 1203.
62. Id. at 1240; see also Kristin E. Hickman & David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron, 81 OHIO
ST. L.J. 611, 642–47 (2020) (documenting the origin and evolution of the debate over Chevron’s
waivability).
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Domain, we address this question as part of our broader
recommendation and contend that our view is, in fact, more consistent
with the justification the judiciary itself has articulated for deference.63
Not everyone will agree with our position, however. And, of course,
other reforms may reject the theories underlying Chevron but
nonetheless urge retention of deference. Would reform along any of
these lines be permissible under rules of precedent? Professor Randy
Kozel thus examines whether a revised version of Chevron is at all
compatible with stare decisis principles.64 Specifically, Kozel addresses
“retheorization, or the recasting of a prior judicial decision based on a
new rationale.”65 The question he addresses, of course, has implications
far beyond debates about Chevron or even administrative law. But his
arguments about retheorization and stare decisis are particularly
important for debates over the future of Chevron and administrative
law more generally, given the Supreme Court’s expressed eagerness to
revisit fundamental aspects in this area.66
Finally, Professor Richard Pierce maintains that the nation’s
present state of political polarization has thoroughly undermined
Chevron’s original promise as a sensible standard that “required courts
to give effect to democratic values in the process of reviewing agency
decisions.”67 According to Pierce, Chevron’s original appeal resided in
the Court’s association of judicial deference with political
accountability—that is, by “anchor[ing] judicial deference to agency
policy decisions in constitutional allocations of decisionmaking power
and the basic principles that underlie our constitutional democracy”—
rather than comparative agency expertise.68 Chevron was supposed to
give agencies leeway to adjust their interpretive policy choices in
response to public preferences as expressed through electoral politics.69
But instead of facilitating a sober flexibility, Pierce argues that the
combination of Chevron and increased political polarity has supported
erratic agency flip-flopping between policy extremes.70 The resulting

63. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 10, at 982–99.
64. See Randy J. Kozel, Retheorizing Precedent, 70 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1025 (2021).
65. Id. at 1026.
66. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the
Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 166 (2019).
67. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Combination of Chevron and Political Polarity Has Awful
Effects, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 91, 92 (2021).
68. Id. at 93–94.
69. Id. at 94.
70. Id. at 103.
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legal uncertainty “makes it impossible for individuals, corporations,
and prospective investors to make wise decisions.”71 Pierce lays the
blame for this state of affairs squarely at the foot of Congress and its
inability to legislate, which leaves presidents with “no choice but to
assert unprecedented power to act in response to serious national
problems.”72 He offers a few ideas for political reform to resolve that
problem.73 In the meantime, however, Pierce reluctantly supports
replacing Chevron with the Skidmore74 standard.75
In short, Chevron is at a crossroads. Scholars, policymakers, and
judges are asking hard questions about both the legality and the
wisdom of judicial deference.76 A doctrine that once seemed sensible
may have lost its coherence or its utility with the passage of time and
changed circumstances. The simple conception of Chevron once
embraced and defended by Justice Scalia and others may have proved
too simple for an increasingly complex administrative state that would
leave the Framers “rubbing their eyes.”77 Or perhaps Chevron still
serves a useful purpose and will merely evolve, as legal standards often
do. Regardless, it is safe to say that the Supreme Court is thinking hard
about the future of Chevron. This Symposium should give the Justices
even more to think about.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 105.
73. See id. at 107–09.
74. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
75. See Pierce, supra note 67, at 103.
76. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature
Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 104 (2018).
77. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quotation
omitted).

